A couple of comments, as if any more were needed, on the Greek situation.
First, the creditors are strongly motivated to put in place a stopgap relief measurespecifically designed to last six months, because this postpones the next phase of the crisis tojust beyond the late-2015 Spanish general elections.The creditors want to avoid, at all cost, any action by Greece (over the summer) that could prove emboldening to left-wing political elements in Spain. It wouldn't be good for the neoliberal creditor agenda if, for example, Greece were to veer into default and immediately begin to make visible progress on its problems. The Germans would much prefer to keep Greece in the sweatbox between now and Christmas, as an example to other countries.
A second thing to keep in mind is that government spending, in Greece, is 60% of GDP. (By contrast, it's only 22% of GDP in the U.S. and around 44% of GDP in the U.K.) Therefore, any austerity measure that results in reduced government spending will impact GDP directly. This means it is probably impossible for Greece to embrace austerity (e.g., pension cuts) and grow its GDP meaningfully. One precludes the other.
Because of recent historic deposit outflows from Greek banks , capital flow controls will likely be imposed at any moment, unless new emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) appears, in some form, today (Monday, 22 June 2015). Greek banks technically no longer meet EU collateral requirements.
Note that the bank run (which has been well underway for weeks) was probably a deliberate action by Greece to get as many physical euros in circulation as possibleahead of a prolonged IMF arrears process (and/or default).
This week, we'll either see a miraculous new last-minute bailout, or we'll see a bank holiday, perhaps followed soon thereafter by introduction of an IOU system or alternate currency. Once cash is blocked (and a system of IOUs is in place), Greece will be in a Schrödinger-cat state, neither fully in the euro nor in a state of exit. To quell fears of a breakdown in the euro, ECB would probably instruct the central banks of core countries to cross-purchase peripheral state bonds (to mutualize risk) in an effort to prop up bond prices while demonstrating minimal convertibility risk. Whether this would be enough to stabilize bond prices overall (e.g. keeping Italian and Spanish bond yields below 4%) is anyone's guess.
If full-on Grexit occurs (later in the summer), the Eurozone countries would no doubt take steps to shore up the euro system, for example with a scheme for area-wide bank deposit guarantees, and/or a euro-area Treasury, and/or collaboration on Eurozone fiscal initiatives (as opposed to purely monetary initiatives). The emphasis will be on not allowing "another Greece."